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KILLING A SUSPECTED FELON FLEEING TO
ESCAPE ARREST*
The authority of a peace officer to kill in effecting an arrest has been a prob-
lem in courts of law since law enforcing agencies were given the power to make
arrests. The law is vaned and many peace officers are not correctly informed of
their privileges and duties until they are being tried for manslaughter or sued for
wrongful death. This note will consider one limited phase of the power of a peace
officer, discuss the conflicting law, and suggest what the law should be. Whether
or not it is justifiable homicide for a peace officer to kill one who is fleeing and,
who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe, has committed a felony, though
in fact no felony has been committed, is the problem to be discussed. Whether
or not the peace officer is in a better position if there were in fact a felony com-
mitted, though by some other person, will necessarily be mentioned in conjunction
with the above problem. This note is not an attempt to determine when a peace
officer can make a legal arrest, nor is its purpose to determine what force an officer
may use to defend himself or to overcome resistance to a lawful arrest. It shall
be presumed for the purpose of this note that the peace officer did not have a
warrant. Also there will be no attempt to differentiate between one who has been
arrested and then flees, and one who is fleeing to avert arrest, as the same rules
govern both cases.'
The law is clear in refusing a peace officer the right to kill one whom he
knows to be a fleeing misdemeanant even though there is no other way to make
the arrest.' It is better that one charged with a petty offense pumshable by fine,
or a short term in jail, escape than that his life be taken. "Human life is too
sacred to admit of a more severe rule."' However, even this simple proposition
has not always been accepted. Hale in his Pleas of the Croton indicates that it
would have been justifiable to kill persons who are pursued " for breach of
the peace or just suspicion thereof, as mght walkers, persons unduly armed,
rand who either flee or resist] for by their resistance against the authority
of the king in his officers they draw their own blood upon themselves."'
The killing of a known felon has presented a problem that the courts have
easily solved. Since all early common law felonies were punishable by death, the
use of a deadly force to capture a felon was not looked upon with disfavor.
Hale says,
"And here is the difference between civil actions and felonies.
"If a man be in danger of arrest by a Capias in debt or tres-
pass, and he flies, and the bailiff kills him, it is murder; but if a felon
flies and he cannot be otherwise taken, if he be killed, it is no felony,
and in that case the officer so killing forfeits nothing, but the person
so assaulted and killed forfeits his goods."
* This is a companion, but contra, note to the one by Mr. ison, infra, pp. 609.
'2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW sec. 648 (9th ed. 1923).
- Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S. E. 2d 91 (1943); Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 480,
3 S. W 622 (1887); 1 EAST, CROWN LAW 302 (1806); 1 WIIARTON. CRIMINAL LAW sec.
532 (12th ed. 1932). (Might kill in case of riots).
'Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 480, 3 S. AV 622 (1887).
4 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 85, 86 (1778); This is not the law today and it
is not clear that it was so in early English law except when the officer reasonably
believed him to be a felon, see note 2, supra.
I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 481 (1778).
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The law today generally allows a police officer to kill a fleeing felon if he
cannot be taken otherwise.' However, due to the fact that some felonies are pun-
ished by short prison terms, there is a tendency of some courts to hold that it is
only for "dangerous" felonies that deadly force may be used in an attempt to
arrest.'
The liability of a police officer for killing a person whom he reasonable be-
lieves to have committed a felony is not uniform in this country. There are three
views as to when the officer is justified:
First: The officer is justified if he has reasonable grounds to
believe that a felony has been committed and that the person fleeing
is guilty of committing this felony whether a felony has in fact been
committed.'
Second: The officer is justified if a felony in fact has been
committed and if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
the person killed committed the felony, whether he committed it
or notY
Third: The officer is justified only if a felony has been
committed and the person killed did in fact commit this felony.n0
Despite the fact that the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the often cited case
of Petrie v. Cartwright" was "unable to find any common law authority" for the
first view, there is eminent authority to support this view. East in his Pleas of the
Crown seems reasonably clear that the first view was the early common law view.
There it is stated that:
"If a private person suspect another of a felony and lay
such ground of suspicion before a constable, and require his assistance
to take him, the constable may justify killing the party if he fly,
though in truth lie were innocent and it was formerly supposed
to le necessary that there should have been a felony committed in
fact, of which the constable must have been ascertained at his peril.
But in Samuel v. Pavne and others, it was determined that a peace
officer might justify an arrest on a charge of a felony on reasonable
suspicion, without a warrant, although it should afterwards appear
that no felony had been committed; but that a private individual in
such case could not. The reason for this is apparent; for if, as Lord
Hale observes in one place, the constable cannot judge whether the
party he guilty or not until he come to his trial, which cannot be until
he he apprehended; (which he thinks a sufficient reason in justifying
him in killing the party accused, if he fly from the arrest and cannot
otherwise be overtaken, however innocent he may afterwards appear to
6Stinnett v. Virginia, 55 F 2d 644 (C.C.A. 4th 1932); Fitzpatrick v. Coin., 210
Ky. 385, 275 S. W. 819 (1925); Thompson v. Norfork & IV Ry. Co., 116 IV. Va. 705,
182 S. E. 880 (1935).
'State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 300 (1871); Reneau v. State, 2 Lea 720 (Tenn. 1879);
See U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710, 713 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1887).
I'Viccaro v. Collier, 38 F. 2d 862 (Md. 1930); Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster,
218 Ala 468, 118 S. 794 (1928); Coldeen v. Reid, 107 Wash. 508, 182 P 599 (1919);
REST, TORTS. sec. 131, 111. 4.
Mylett's Adm'r v. Burnley, 163 Ky. 277 280, 173 S. W 759, 760 (1915),
Officer " acts at his peril, and can justify only on the ground that a felony had
been committed." State v. Roane, 13 N. C. 38, 42 (1828); "When an individual
commits a honucide upon the ground of making an arrest, he must show a felony
committed, if not by the person killed, at least by someone, TiE ANiERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEmNGS, Vol. IX, p. 179 (1931).
1"Conraddy v. People, 5 Park 234 (N. Y. 1862); Commonwealth v. Duerr 158
Pa. Super 484, 45 A. 2d 235 (1946).
"t 114 Ky. 103, 70 S. W 279, 59 LRA 720 (1902).
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have been;) so it must be equally impossible for the constable to ascer-
tain whether a felony were actually committed or not: but in most
cases he must take both the one and the other upon the credit of the
party who lays the charge before him. Therefore all that can in reason
be required of him is that he should inform himself as well as he can
of the circumstances; and that the relation of the party should appear
creditable."'"
One of the leading cases holding that a police officer may kill one who he has
reasonable grounds to suspect has committed a felony is People v. Kilwngton."
Here one Howard, who had seen the deceased come out of a backyard, began
chasing him and calling "Stop thief!" In fact the deceased had committed no
crime. The defendant, a police officer, heard this and saw Howard chasing the
deceased. The defendant ordered him to stop and then shot and killed him. The
upper court held that the trial court was in error for allowing the jury to determine
if the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that a felony had been com-
mitted. The court said that this was for the judge to determine and that in fact
the defendant did have cause to believe a felony had been committed. The court
stated:
"An officer who would refuse to arrest a person fleeing and
pursued under the circumstances disclosed in this case, because the
charge was not more direct and specific as to the commission of a fel-
only, would be justly censurable for neglect of official duty.1 '
The only question for the jury should have been whether the officer used
more force than necessary to arrest the deceased.
In Coldeen v. Reid," two boys either borrowed or stole an automobile. While
driving at a fast rate of speed they passed a car with several sheriffs in it. The
sheriffs pulled along side and the boys, believing that the persons in the other car
wanted to race, increased their speed. Several shots were fired by the officers
and one of the boys was killed. In an action to recover for the wrongful death
the trial court held that since the boys were guilty of a mere misdemeanor the
killing was not justified and therefore the plaintiff was given a verdict. The
appellate court reversed this on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to
make it a question for the jury whether or not the officer had reasonable grounds
to believe that a felony had been committed. If there had been reasonable
grounds to so believe then the plaintiff could not have recovered.
An Alabama case,"0 decided in 1928, also takes the position that an officer may
shoot to kill one fleeing, when necessary, if he has reasonable grounds to believe
that a felony has been committed. The court took this position because in Ala-
bama an officer can arrest on reasonable grounds of belief that a felony has been
committed. The only problem that faced the court was to determine whether the
force used was necessary. If it were necessary, then the shooting was justified.
It is submitted that this first view has the merit of being both logical and
easily understood. In supporting it, one need have no quarrel with the desirable
and general rule that the amount of force used to effect an arrest must not exceed
1 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 301, 302 (1803).
13 104 Cal. 86, 37 Pac. 799 (1894).
1 Id. at -- 37 Pac. at 801.
15 Coldeen v. Reid, 107 Wash. 508, 182 p. 599 (1919).
"Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 118 S. 794 (1928).
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what is reasonably necessary. The point is that, if the arrest itself is justified, a
peace officer should not be kept in enforced ignorance of the amount of force be
ma, justifiably use until he is able to determine with certainty whether the facts
which lie has reasonable ground to believe are actually true or not. Such deter-
ination cannot possibly be made with certainty until the opportunity to arrest
has passed, even in many cases of unquestionable guilt.
Clearly there are cases sustaining the first view; but what of the second view
that a felony must be committed by someone though not necessarily the person
killed? The Amencan Law Institute took this latter view in a tentative code of
Criminal Lav. An officer is not justified unless " (e) the person killed or
wounded is the person named in the warrant if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant
or, if the arrest is without a warrant the offense was committed by some one and
the officer reasonably believes it was committed by the person killed or wounded."
7
The cases are not clear when it comes to determimng whether they take the
second or third view. The courts do not expressly say that the arrestee need not
be guilty, but rather that it is necessary that the officers show that a "felony had
been committed."'" The leading case of Petrie v. Cartwright" is typical in that
it is not easily determined whether the person killed must be the felon before the
officer is justified or whether the officer vill be justified if a felony in fact has been
committed by someone though not the person killed.
In this case, Joe Petrie hit one of the two men who had earlier in the mght
made indecent remarks to his wife. After a brief fight Petrie ran away. In his at-
tempt to run Petrie knocked down one of the men who had been drinking. The
defendant, who was city marshal, was in sight a few yards away, and seeing the
man fall when Petrie ran past, called to Petrie to halt, and when he did not stop,
fired into the ground. His second shot killed Petrie. This was an action for wrong-
fiil death brought bv deceased's wife. The Kentucky Court of Appeals first stated
that Petne had committed no felony. It went on to say'
"We have becn uiable to find any common law authority
jastif ing an officer in killing a person sought to be arrested, who fled
from him. where the officer acted upon suspicion, and no felony had
bcen in fact committed. The common-law rule allowing an officer to
kill a felon in order to arrest him rests upon the idea that felons ought
not to be at large, and that the life of a felon has been forfeited; for
felonies at common law were punishable by death. But where no
felony has been committed the reason of the rule does not apply, and
it seems to us that the sacredness of human life and the danger of
abuse do not permit an extension of the common law rule to cases
of suspected felonies. It is never allowed [shooting by officer]
where the offense is only a misdemeanor, and where there is only a
suspicion of felony the officer is iot warranted in treating the fugitive
as a felon. If he does this, he does so at his own peril, and is liable
if it turns out that lie is nstaken."' 5
Obviously a peace officer in a jurisdiction following either of the first two
views would be justified if the felony had in fact been committed by the person
killed. However, in several jurisdictions, adhering to the third view, he is justified
r- THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE'S PROCEENINGS, Vol. IX, p. 179 (1931).
" See note 9, supra.
" See note 11, supra
"Id. at 109, 70 S. NV at 299.
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only if the felony had in fact been committed by the person killed. In. accepting
this iew these jurisdictions seem to tie the hands of the law enforcing agency.21
A mistaken belief by the officer, no matter how reasonable, may result in a con-
viction of homicide.
A fairly recent case taking the rigid view that the person killed must have
in fact committed the felony is Commonwealth v. Duerr." In this case the police
arrested a car thief who told the police of a supposed rendezvous with his accom-
plices. The police laid a trap but caught the wrong men. These men fled and
were killed. The court held that no matter how reasonable the grounds of sus-
picion may be an officer making an arrest without a warrant on suspicion of a
felony was not justified in killing the suspect in order to effect the arrest, unless a
felony has in fact been committed by him.
What is the law in Kentucky today? It is clear that Petrie v. Cartwright,
which clearly takes the position that a felony must in fact have been committed
by someone, and almost as clearly that the person fired upon must be the felon,
should be our starting point. An attempt has been made to distinguish this case
on the basis that the court says that mere "suspicion" is not justification. One
writer in the Michigan Law Review discussing the Petrie case said, that admitting
one cannot kill on mere suspicion " is it not desirable to kill as a last resort
to effectuate arrest in the case of one who, he has reasonable ground to suppose, is
an actual felon?"' This attempt to differentiate between "mere suspicion" and
"reasonable grounds" is not tenable since the trial court instructed that if the
defendant had "reasonable ground to believe a felony had been committed, the
jury should find for the defendant." The higher court reversed the trial court on
this point.
Robinson s New Kentucky Criminal Law and Proceduree' states that Petric
v. Cartwright is the lav in Kentucky. It seems, however, that two recent cases
may ,indicate that Kentucky is abandoning this view. In Martin v. Common-
wealth,"' there was a fight in which one of the participants was using steel knucks
(a deadly weapon). The deceased, by use of a pistol, prevented bvstanders from
giving aid to the one who did not have steel knucks. The court held that if the
fighter was using the knucks with malicious intent to kill or wound, then lie was
committing a felony, and the deceased by protecting him, shared in the conmns-
sion of that felony. The defendant saw the deceased and another run away and
later he. followed. When it seemed that the deceased was gtting away the de-
fendant fired at and killed him. The court went on to say-
"Martin had seen the fight and lie certainl) had reas-
onable grounds to believe a felony had been commilled: then it became
his duty, even without a warrant, to arrest the suspected felon.
It then became the duty of Martin and the officers with him to use
such force as was necessary to effect his arrest, and it was then dut)
not to allow him to escape, and when, his escape appeared prob-
-1 See note 10, supra; Lacy v. State 7 Tex. Crim. App. 403 (1879).
- 158 Pa. Super 484, 45 A. 2d 235 (1946).
Pearson, The Right to Kill in Makig Arrests, 28 Mien. L. REv. 957, 971
(1930).
- Sec. 286 (2d ed. 1927).
- 2 5 7 Ky. 59f, 78 S. W 2d 786 (1935).
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ablc. the c officers wcrc authorized to kill him rather than let him
cscapc, and the killing was justifiable: "- (italics Writer s.)
The latest Kentucky case, Bailey v. Commonwealth,' seems to have taken
this jurisdiction entirely away from the view as expressed in Petrie v. Cartwright.
The deceased in this case requested the defendants, who were peace officers, to
arrest a certain person with whom he had been fighting. The officers refused and
told deceased to get a warrant. He returned with a shotgun and demanded that
the officers go with him. The officers asked hin to lower his gun and went toward
him. He did lower his gun, but it discharged, striking one of the defendants in
the foot. He unbreaclied his gun and ran. The defendants killed him while lie
was running avay. In reversing a conviction, the court said:
"He fired first. The shot may or may not have been fired
accidentally. He unbreached the gun and started running to-
wards some parked cars. Under the circumstances it was not only their
right but the duty of the officers to shoot Trusty if it became necessary
to do so to take him into custody. They had every right to believe
that Trusty intended to continue the affray from behind the parked
cars. The officers had not only the right to protect themselves,
but the shooting having been committed in their presence it was their
duty as peace officers to use whatever force they deemed necessary to
take Trusty in custody.-- (Italics Writers)
Plainly, jurisdictions differ considerably in their views on justifiable killing by
officers. What can be said as to what the law should be? Should a peace officer
be justified in killing a person who is fleeing if the officer has reasonable grounds
to believe that a felony has been committed by that person, and there is no other
means of effecting the arrest? The answer to this must be based on whether
society will benefit or lose by giving its law enforcement agency this protection.
To the innocent citizen the requirement to stop for a lawful arrest is no great
bar on his freedom of movement. To the murderer or robber it would be a great
advantage to know that the police officer will not kill him if le runs for fear that
a felony has not been in fact committed, or that this may not be the felon in any
case, and he will be tried for homicide. The officer is in the middle. If a felony
has in fact been committed and lie doesn't make the arrest, he may be held re-
sponsible for neglect of is duty.
An article by "Waite ' supports the view that a felony need not in fact have
been committed.
"Certainly," he says, "'if lie [the peace officer] had reason-
able ground to believe the fugitive guilty lie could not be held crim-
mallN liable for killing ini, consistently with the accepted common
law rule that reasonable mistake of facts negatives liability if the facts,
had thc been as believed, would have negatived it."4
It is necessary for the law enforcement of a community that all persons submit
to lawful arrest. If they choose not to do so, then they are the ones who take the
risk. This does not mean that a peace officer is made the sole judge and jury
of whether to kill or not. The arrest must be a lawful one to begin with, and the
'Id. at 593, 78 S. A. 2d 786, 787.
2'310 Ky. 731, 221 S. W 2d 693 (1949).
"Id. at 733, 221 S. IV 2d 693.
Waitc, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MIeH. L. REv. 448-68
(1931).
1'Id. at 465, n. 41.
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officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been committed
by the person before he may shoot to effect his arrest. Whether his grounds were
reasonable or not will be determined by a jury and if they were not reasonable,
no protection would be afforded the officer by the suggested rule.
Another limitation could reasonably be imposed by requiring that the officer
have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested is aware that an
arrest by a police officer is being attempted and therefore could avoid injury by
subission.3
Statutes have been suggested which would further limit the power of the
officer by only allowing him to kill one who he reasonably believes has committed a
malor felony or is attempting to commit one. Included in this category are the
following offenses: criminal homicide, rape, arson, burglary, robbery, kidnaping,
and mayhem.' There are many statutory felomes today that prescribe but one or
two years in the penitentiary, and it does seem harsh that a life should be taken in
the case of a minor felon, but the utility of arrest of a major felon still outweighs
the taking of his life.
It is worth mentiomng again that the burden should always be upon the offi-
cer to prove that it was impossible to effect the arrest by means short of those
employed.
It seems, therefore, that a police officer should be allowed to kill a person
fleeing from lawful arrest or attempted arrest when lie has reasonable grounds to
believe that a major felony has been committed or attempted by, the person he is
seeking to arrest, and reasonable grounds to believe that this person is aware of
the attempted arrest, provided the arrest cannot be effected by less forceful means.
GERALD RoiuN GniFFiN
31Id. at 467, 468, n. 42.
1 24 IowA L. REv. 154, 162 (1938).
